Writ Petition No. 10839 of 2017 (Quashing an FIR outside the jurisdiction of high courts)

A petition was filed under Art.199 of the Constitution of The Islamic Republic of Pakistan to quash the F.I.R. No.314-2017, registered under s.489-F PPC in the Lahore High Court’s Multan Bench.

The facts of the case were as follows: Respondent No.2 (complainant) purchased a land measuring 40-kanals from the petitioner via an agreement to sell for the consideration of Rs.50,00,000/-.  Rs.10,00,000/- was paid in advance and the remainder of Rs.40,00,000/- was to be paid after the completion of the execution of the agreement of sale by July 15, 2016. On August 10, 2016 the agreement was amended and the total land being sold to respondent No.2 was decided to be 80-kanals for the total consideration of Rs.1,00,00,000 for which Rs.55,00,000 were paid in advance. Respondent No.2, requested a check for the advance payment on December 12, 2016 which was dishonored by the bank, in response to which the respondent lodged an FIR against the petitioner.

The petitioner contended that the cheque in question was given to the respondent as a guarantee. Since the complainant failed to comply with the terms of the sale agreement, the agreement was then cancelled and when the petitioner demanded the cheque in question to be returned, the respondent instead of returning the cheque, tried to cash it from the bank, which resulted in the cheque being dishonored. The F.I.R. lodged immediately after this was malafide and was done after the misuse of the guarantee cheque. In addition to this the entire transaction constituted a civil liability, which should have been pursued instead. Therefore, the impugned F.I.R. should be quashed.

The respondent submitted that the F.I.R. was conclusive proof of the respondent defaulting on his duty to pay, pursuant to the agreement of sale.

The judge presiding over this case cited the case of Col. Shah Sadiq. Vs. Muhammad Ashiq & others (2006 S.C.M.R. 276) where the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High court would be overstepping its jurisdiction if it quashed FIRs and interrupted the normal procedure of law as provided under the CPC 1898. Also the party seeking the FIR to be quashed had the option to do so at the trial court, where the charge was being framed or after the evidence had been recorded against it. There were also alternative remedies available to the under the CrPC sec.265K and 249-A via a relevant magistrate, not through the high court. The case of Ajmeel Khan. Vs. Abdur Rahim and others (PLD 2009 S.C. 102) was also cited, where the Supreme Court held that once an FIR was registered, the superior courts had a set precedent of refraining from direct interference with police investigations in criminal cases as this may be prejudicial to the accused and to the fairness of the proceedings, along with being outside the jurisdiction of the court. The only reasons permitting such an action would if be the FIR’s registration appeared to be a misuse of the process of law or without any legal justification.
The judge also noted that according to the Supreme Court in Muhammad Mansha. Vs. Station House Officer, P.S. City, Chiniot, etc.” (PLD 2006 S.C. 598) quashing an FIR by resorting to art.199 of the Constitution was an extraordinary remedy which could be invoked only in exceptional circumstances which had not been provided by the petitioner.

After perusing the contents of the FIR, the judge found the offence to be soundly premised as stated in it. He held that it was a settled principle of law that the prosecution case could not be quashed at the initial stage except by a trial court and that there were alternative remedies available to the petitioner before the trial court, due to which the current petition had no force and was therefore, dismissed.